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plied a sufficient number of times to demonstrate that such an expedient does not up-
set the machinery of the fonun.36 Perhaps in this last connection a distinction may
arise between claims governed by the law of a sister state and claims governed by the
law of'a foreign country.
Constitutional Law-Court Review of Rate Base Determinations-Smyth v. Ames
Overruled?-[United States].-The Federal Power Commission, pursuant to its au-
thority under the Natural Gas Act of 1938,1 entered an interim order that the defend-
ant company reduce its annual operating revenues by $3,750,000. For the purposes of
this order the commission accepted the company's estimates of the reproduction cost
of its properties, the value of its gas reserves, the life of its properties, and its operating
income, but rejected the company's claim of $8,500,000 for going value and part of its
claim for future capital expenditures. The circuit court of appeals vacated the order
because the commission bad not made a separate allowance for going concern value and
had amortized the cost of the properties over their entire service life and not merely
over their unexpired service life from the date of regulation or entry of the commis-
sion's order.2 The United States Supreme Court reversed this decision. Held: x) that
going value measured by the previous cost of getting business and maintaining excess
capacity need not be separately included in the rate base in view of the failure to show
that these items had not been recouped as expenses during the unregulated period; 2)
that amortization was properly calculated upon the basis of original rather than repro-
duction cost, over the entire life of the properties and not merely over their unexpired
life, and by the sinking fund method with interest equal to the rate of return; and 3)
that, considering the decline of general business profits and the absence of hazard, a
rate of return of 62 per cent was not confiscatory. Three justices concurred on the
grounds that the due process clause does not give courts power to invalidate rates as
unreasonable and that under the statute the commission has "a broad area of discretion
for selection of an appropriate rate base" subject to the "barest minimum" of court
review. Federal Power Com'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America.3
Although the three concurring justices4 and some commentatorss seem to regard
this case as substantially changing court review of rate making, more cautious com-
ment would emphasize the Federal Power Commission's third failure6 with the present
court to obtain explicit reversal of Smyth v. Ames,7 and the fact that three justices felt
obliged to concur separately. Mr. Chief Justice Stone in the majority opinion identi-
36 Notes 28, 31 supra.
'52 Stat. 821 (i938), 15 U.S.C.A. § 717 (x939).
2 Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 12o F. (2d) 625 (C.C.A. 7th 1941).
362 S. Ct. 736 (1942). .4 Ibid., at 750.
s See 29 Pub. Utilities Fortnightly 505 (1942); N.Y. Times, p. 31, col. 6 (March 17, 1942);
Public Utility Rate Regulation: The End of the Rule of Smyth v. Ames, 5i Yale L.J. 1027
(1942). But see Hale, Does the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames Still Walk?, 55 Harv. L. Rev. iz16
(1942).
6 See the briefs of the Federal Power Commission in Railroad Com'n of California v. Pacific
Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388 (1938), in Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104
(ig39), and in the principal case.
7 169 U.S. 466 (i893).
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fled the statutory standard of the "lowest reasonable rate" with the lowest non-con-
fiscatory rate; discussing the latter rate, he emphasized the freedom of rate-making
bodies in the choice of formulae and the "dear showing" of confiscation which must
be made to invalidate a rate order.' But such statements have been made before' and
they seem to be made here more as a general introduction to the specific discussion
than as a reversal of an old tradition.
Nor do the specific holdings and the manner of reaching them indicate a change in
the Court's position. The majority seem to use an original cost rather than a reproduc-
tion cost base to find an allowance for going concern value; but this use of original cost
is not new,' ° and the majority emphasize that these original costs were incurred in a
high cost period and continue to speak of " 'present value.' "I' The majority also per-
mit the amortization of the original cost rather than the reproduction cost of the prop-
erties; but they emphasize the limited life of the assets and refuse to rule that "there
can in no circumstances be a constitutional requirement that the amortization be the
reproduction value rather than the actual cost ..... ". ,2 Moreover, the fact that the
Court here discussed these rate regulation issues in detail indicates that it will continue
to review rates for substantive due process. In historical perspective, these changes (if
they are changes at all) in the application of the "fair value" rule seem far less impor-
tant than others which time has proved did not foreshadow its abandonment.X3
However, when the three justices concurring separately hereX4 are added to the two
others who have previously indicated readiness to abandon court review on the basis
of "fair value,"zs it becomes apparent that a majority of the Court will when necessary
8 FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 S. Ct. 736, 743 (1942).
9 Former Chief justice Hughes has emphasized that the rate base is not determined by
any formula, and that the power to invalidate rates is to be exercised only in clear cases. The
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 434-35, 452-53 (I913); Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Railroad Com'n of California, 289 U.S. 287, 304-6, 314 (1933).
1°Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Com'n of California, 289 U.S. 287, 313
et seq. (1933).
"1 FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 S. Ct. 736, 743-44 (r942).
12 Ibid., at 746.
r3 Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Com'n of California, 289 U.S. 287 (i933)
(emphasizing the burden of proving confiscation and adjusting accounts to find allowances for
excluded items); Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U.S. ISI (1934) (giving suc-
cessful operations weight in determining that rates were not confiscatory); Dayton Power &
Light Co. v. Public Utility Com'n of Ohio, 292 U.S. 290 (1934) (rate of return under rates
proposed so low as to suggest that rate base was inflated); Railroad Com'n of California v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388 (i938) (commission is only required to consider repro-
duction cost and may reject it as a measure of value).
14 Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Murphy.
S Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred separately in Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co.
307 U.S. 104 (i939), because he felt that the majority opinion, in taking a roundabout course
to avoid overruling Smyth v. Ames, seemed to give new vitality to the "fair value" rule. In that
case he said: "The only relevant function of law in dealing with .... [rate regulation] is to
secure observance of those procedural safeguards in the exercise of legislative power which are
historic foundations of due process." His disagreement with the concurring justices in the
principal case was perhaps only as to its appropriateness as a vehicle for overruling the old
doctrine. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 S. Ct. 736, 754 (x942). His opinions in the
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make some change. The question suggested by the principal case is what sort of re-
view the Court will adopt to replace that which a majority of its members are now pre-
pared to abandon.
The first possible course would be that the Court adopt as the constitutional stand-
ard of confiscation one or more of the factors which have previously only been con-
sidered as evidence of "fair value."' 6 Of the two principal factors-prudent invest-
ment and reproduction cost-the former has been most favored by dissenting justices17
and the writers, 8 and has been proposed by the Federal Power Commission. x9 Despite
the enormous improvements which would ensue from the adoption of prudent invest-
ment as the standard of confiscation, the adoption of any constitutional rate base
would keep the courts in a technical field which has proved unsuited for judicial ac-
tion,"0 would hamper the rate-fixing tribunals in their efforts to adjust rates in the
public interest," and would continue to divert attention to the rate base from the more
Texas oil proration cases, Railroad Com'n of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573
(1940), 31 U.S. 570 (1941), 3x1 U.S. 614 (i941), though indicating a willingness to leave tech-
nical questions to the administrative bodies created to handle them, are not in point because
no attempt was made to show that the proration orders would prevent the owner from earning
a return upon his investment. See 5i Yale L.J. 1027, 1033 n. 44 (1942).
Mr. Chief Justice Stone has repeatedly dissented in cases invalidating rates. McCardle v.
Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926); St. Louis & O'Fallon R. Co. v. United States,
279 U.S. 461 (1929); West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Baltimore, 295 U.S.
662 (1935). In a concurring opinion in St. Joseph Stockyards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38,
93 (1936), Mr. Justice Cardozo and he indicated that if the scope of court review in rate cases
were to be re-examined, they would not approve the old doctrine.
,6 Graham and Katz, Accounting in Law Practice 227 (1938) lists the following measures of
value which are variations of the two principal Tactors: i) original cost; 2) historical cost;
3) book cost; 4) investment cost or outstanding capitalization; 5) prudent investment cost;
6) reproduction cost value; 7) split inventory value; 8) taxation value; 9) market value; and io)
purchase value. See also Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in State ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co. v. Public Service Com'n of Missouri, 262 U.S. 276, 294 n. 6 (1923).
Z7Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, State ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Pub-
lic Service Com'n of Missouri, 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923); Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, McCart
v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419, 423 (1938).
'8 Bauer, Public Policy Concept of Valuation for Purposes of Public Utility Rate Control,
27 Geo. L. J. 403 (1939); 2 Bonbright, Valuation of Property 1155 (1937); Lyon and Abram-
son, Government and Economic Life 69o (i94o); Hale, Conflicting Judicial Criteria of Utility
Rates-The Need for Judicial Restatement, 38 Col. L. Rev. 959 (1938). Contra: Graham,
Public Utility Valuation (r934); Dorety, The Function of Reproduction Cost in Public Utility
Valuation and Rate Making, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1923).
'9 See briefs cited note 6 supra.
"0 See Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring, St. Joseph Stockyards v. United States, 298 U.S.
38, 73 (1936), on the length and complexity of rate proceedings. Court interference tends to
give rate hearings the character of lawsuits with the consequent delays, expense, and distrac-
tion of purpose. Bauer and Gold, The Electric Power Industry c. 13 (i939).
" The use of other rate bases might increase the commissions' freedom, but any constitu-
tional rate base would hinder efforts to reduce utility prices in line with other prices during
depressions, or to increase the consumption of power. See Public Service Com'n of Wisconsin,
State-Wide Investigation of the Wisconsin Telephone Co. (X932); Fainsod, Regulation and
Efficiency, 49 Yale L.J. 1191 (i94o).
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important tasks of regulation.22 Moreover, the adoption of an economically or logically
consistent and understandable rate base23 might result in even more court interference
in the rate-making process than was possible under the "fair return upon fair value"
rule.'4
The second course would be the abandonment of any review of the confiscatory
character of the rates adopted and the confining of the judicial function in rate-making
to preserving procedural due process.2s Although most of the discussion has been in
terms of what would be the best rate base to adopt under the first course, recent ex-
pressions by four members of the Court seem to favor the abandonment of court re-
view. Mr. Justice Black26 (and perhaps the other concurring justices in the principal
case) argues that the Constitution does not deprive the states of the power to fix utility
rates without interference from the federal courts and cites the early cases holding that
rate regulation is exclusively a legislative function. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, on the
other hand, is more impressed with the fact that rate regulation is a legislative function"
entrusted to the commissions and not to the courts but does not believe that the cases
cited by Mr. Justice Black establish the inconsistency between judicial review and re-
spect for legislative power . 7 Whatever the theory, the withdrawal of the courts from
the rate-making process would remove an interference which has been said to be one of
the causes of the failure of utility regulation,28 and would leave commissions free upon
2 Other factors of more importance to consumers than the size of the rate base are the rate
of return, the operating expenses, and the extent to which the rate schedule maximizes the use
of the service. Fainsod, op. cit. supra note 21; Lyon and Abramson, Government and Economic
Life 704, 707 (1940).
' 2The "present value" rule is bitterly criticized as logically inconsistent because a reduction
in rates and earnings must reduce value, and because it affords no criteria for choosing among
the elements of value. 2 Bonbright, Valuation of Property iogi (1937); Lyon and Abramson,
Government and Economic Life 683, 692 (1940).
24 Under the "present value" rule the Court has ranged from giving the most weight to
spot reproduction cost, McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926), to giving
the most weight to prudent investment, Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U.S.
151 (1934). It has recently permitted commissions to reject measures of value which seem un-
reliable. Railroad Com'n of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 3o2 U.S. 388 (1938).
The Court has also found margins for the correction of omissions from the rate base in other
excessive allowances. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Com'n of California, 289
U.S. 287 (1933); Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utility Com'n of Ohio, 292 U.S. 290
(1934). Indeed, the "present value" base has been so vague and unworkable in practice that
commissions have had a great deal of freedom in choosing their rate base. Lyon and Abramson,
Government and Economic Life 700 (1940).
2s Berkson, Due Process Requirements of a Fair Hearing in a Rate Proceeding, 38 Col. L.
Rev. 978 (1938).
2
6 Dissenting in McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419, 423 (1938), and con-
curring in United Gas Public Service Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123, 146 (1938).
27 Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 122 (i939). Mr. justice Frankfurter
had previously emphasized the need for responsible local administration, and had suggested
that court review be confined to state courts. Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government c. 3
(1930).
28 The other cause of regulation failure is said to be poor administration. 2 Bonbright,
Valuation of Property 1154 (i937); Bauer and Gold, The Electric Power Industry c. 13 (i939);
Frankfurter, op cit. supra note 27, at 120.
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their own responsibility to develop positive programs of regulation. The adoption of
this course would render unnecessary independent court scrutiny of the findings of fact
in rate making cases 9 and would thus contribute further to the freedom of the prime
rate regulating bodies. The regulating bodies would then be subject only to the re-
straints of their own training and responsibilities, of the economic necessity of main-
taining utility credit and encouraging utility management, and of final resort to the
legislature.
A third course, intermediate between the other two, would involve the retention by
the courts of the power to invalidate rates for extreme instances of confiscation. This
course might appeal to the Court if it did not wish either to foreclose completely re-
view of the occasional gross errors which are made in rate regulationso or to overrule
such a long-established line of precedent, but wished instead to maintain a certain
.amount of freedom of action. But the new liberty which this course would give com-
missions must be dearly announced and its bounds clearly defined or commissions
haunted by the spectre of court review will hesitate to develop progressive methods of
regulation. In adopting this course the Court might refuse to invalidate rates yielding
a fair return upon any recognized rate base;31 it might also accept rates yielding no fair
return upon any base where the interests of consumers32 or the public33 require sub-
ordination of the interests of investors. Rates would then only deprive owners of their
property without due process of law when no rational basis to support them could be
suggested.
Whichever view is adopted, the concurring justices seem justified in their desire to
clarify the law as soon as possible. It cannot be too much emphasized that the chief
fault of court review in the past has been the vagueness and uncertainty of the standard
applied, and the principal case does little to eliminate that uncertainty. Under present
circumstances, with commissions as willing to pay lip service to the old rule as they
29 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920); St. Joseph Stockyards
v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936). Independent court review of the facts has been predicated
upon the necessity of determining whether the property will be confiscated; but should the
course discussed in the text be followed, thi courts would review only to determine whether
the utility had been granted a fair hearing, and errors of fact in determining the rate base
would be irrelevant.
30 E.g., refusing to allow amortization for gas fields expected to be exhausted in three
years, Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utility Com'n of Ohio, 292 U.S. 398 (i934); mathe-
matical errors, omissions from the rate base by mistake, and inconsistent methods of allocating
costs, West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utility Com'n of Ohio (No. i), 294 U.S. 63 (1935). See
Bauer and Gold, Public Utility Valuation for Purposes of Rate Control cC. 2-4 (1934), for
a discussion of rate cases in which rates were held to be too low under any standard.
31 See note 6 supra. This view would require only a slight expansion of the discretion al-
ready given commissions in choosing measures of present value. Railroad Com'n of Cali-
fornia v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388 (1938).
32 See the statement of the concurring justices in the principal case. FPC v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 62 S. Ct. 736, 753 (1942).
33 Economists testifying before the Wisconsin Commission in the depths of the depression
emphasized the necessity of reducing sticky prices to promote recovery, regardless of the in-
justice to the particular utility. Public Service Com'n of Wisconsin, State-wide Investigation
of the Wisconsin Telephone Co. (1932).
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are, and courts as willing to construe it liberally,34 the case requiring a square over-
ruling may be long in coming.
Constitutional Law-Deprivation of Right to Assistance of Counsel by Appointment
of Attorney Representing Co-conspirator-[United States].-Glasser and Kretske, as-
sistant United States attorneys, were convicted of a conspiracy to defraud the govern-
ment by fixing liquor tax violations. x At the trial, one of Kretske's lawyers was unable
to appear and Kretske moved for a continuance, being dissatisfied with his remaining
counsel. The court suggested that StewartY one of Glasser's attorneys, act also for
Kretske. Stewart raised the question of a possible conflict of interests,3 and Glasser also
objected. The court then directed Kretske's lawyer to stay in the case. After a con-
ference at the defense table, Stewart indicated his willingness to represent Kretske.
Glasser, who was present, did not renew his objection. Appealing his conviction,
Glasser contended that he had been denied the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment.4 He also contended that he had been denied a trial by an impartial
jury, alleging that all the women on the panel were members of the Illinois League of
Women Voters, and were biassed in favor of the prosecution, having attended lectures
on jury service sponsored by the league.s These allegations were supported by Glas-
ser's affidavit. The conviction was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals.6 On writ
of certiorari the Supreme Court held, the trial court, by suggesting that counsel for one
defendant represent a co-defendant, infringed the former's right to assistance of coun-
sel, and it was not necessary to determine the "precise degree of prejudice" resulting
therefrom. Mere acquiescence by defendant was not a waiver of the right. A jury, se-
lected from a private organization, and partisan by training, is not representative of the
community, and had a proper offer of proof of these allegations been made, a new trial
of all the defendants would have been necessary, but defendant's affidavit was not a
sufficient offer of proof. Judgment reversed as to Glasser, two justices dissenting. Glas-
ser v. United States.7
34 Compare the attitudes of the commissions and the Court in the two most recent previous
cases which afforded opportunities to overrule Smyth v. Ames: Railroad Com'n of California
v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388 (1938), and Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co.,
307 U.S. io4 (1939). The principal case is a continuation of this mutual accommodation.
The Federal Power Commission, however, is now forcing the issue by refusing to allow evi-
dence of reproduction cost to be admitted in rate cases.
x Section 37, Criminal Code, Rev. Stat. § 544o (1875), i8 U.S.C.A. § 88 (1927).
2 William Scott Stewart, author of Stewart on Trial Strategy (i94o).
3 Stewart also raised the objection that his representation of Kretske might tend to asso-
ciate Glasser with Kretske in the minds of the jurors, but he later decided that no harm would
result in this respect if the jurors were informed of the circumstances of his appointment.
R., at i8o, 183.
4 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to .... trial, by an im-
partial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, .... and
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
s He also alleged that women otherwise qualified, but not members of the league, were
systematically excluded. There were six women on the jury in the instant case.
6 United States v. Glasser, 116 F. (2d) 6go (C.C.A. 7th i94o).
762 S. Ct. 457 (1942), noted in 28 A.B.A.J. 190 (1942), and io Kan. City L. Rev. 117
(1942).
